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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 We are asked whether the Bankruptcy Court, without 
running afoul of Article III of the Constitution, can confirm a 
Chapter 11 reorganization plan containing nonconsensual 
third-party releases and injunctions.  On the specific, 
exceptional facts of this case, we hold that the Bankruptcy 
Court was permitted to confirm the plan because the existence 
of the releases and injunctions was “integral to the 
restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship.”  Stern v. 
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 497 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  We further conclude that the remainder 
of this appeal is equitably moot, and we will therefore affirm 
the decision of the District Court. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 The debtors before the Bankruptcy Court and District 
Court were Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC (“Holdings”), 
its wholly-owned subsidiary, Millennium Health LLC, and 
RxAnte, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Millennium 
Health LLC, all of which we will refer to collectively as 
“Millennium.”  Millennium (as reorganized), along with 
certain of its direct and indirect pre-reorganization 
shareholders, specifically TA Millennium, Inc. (“TA”), TA 
Associates Management, L.P., and James Slattery,1 are the 
Appellees in this matter.   
                                              
1 Slattery was the founder of Millennium, has served in 
high-level positions in the company, and established trusts “for 
the benefit of himself and/or members of his family [and 
which] own approximately 79.896 percent of the stock of 
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 Millennium provides laboratory-based diagnostic 
services.  In April 2014, it entered into a $1.825 billion credit 
agreement with a variety of lenders, including a variety of 
funds and accounts managed by Voya Investment Management 
Co. LLC and Voya Alternative Asset Management LLC 
which, for convenience, we will refer to collectively as 
“Voya.”  Ultimately, Millennium used the proceeds from the 
2014 credit agreement to refinance certain of its then-existing 
financial obligations and to pay a nearly $1.3 billion special 
dividend to its shareholders.   
 
 In March 2015, following a several-year investigation 
that dated back to at least 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts against Millennium, alleging 
violations of various laws, including the False Claims Act.  
Less than a month earlier, the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) had notified Millennium that it 
would be revoking Millennium’s Medicare billing privileges, 
the lifeblood of Millennium’s business.  In May 2015, 
Millennium reached an agreement in principle with the DOJ, 
CMS, and other government entities to pay $256 million to 
settle various claims against it.   
 
 Shortly thereafter, however, Millennium concluded that 
it lacked adequate liquidity to both service its debt obligations 
under the 2014 credit agreement and make the required 
settlement payment to the government.  Millennium thus 
informed the 2014 credit agreement lenders of the 
government’s claims and the decision to settle, prompting the 
                                              
[Millennium Lab Holdings, Inc.][,]” a substantial pre-
reorganization shareholder of Millennium.  (App. at 981.)  
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formation of an ad hoc group of lenders, of which Voya was a 
member, to begin working with Millennium and its primary 
shareholders, TA and Millennium Lab Holdings, Inc. 
(“MLH”), to negotiate a transaction that would allow the 
company to satisfy the settlement requirements and restructure 
its financial obligations.  As those negotiations progressed, the 
ad hoc group began suggesting that there were potential claims 
against MLH and TA relating to the 2014 credit agreement, 
including a lack of disclosure regarding the government’s 
investigation into Millennium’s business.  Millennium, MLH, 
TA, and the ad hoc group began discussing how to resolve 
those potential claims.   
 
While negotiating with the ad hoc group, Millennium 
informed the government that it could not pay the $256 million 
settlement without restructuring its other financial obligations.  
The government ultimately set a deadline of October 2, 2015, 
“by which the Company was required to finalize a proposal 
supported by the prepetition lenders and the Equity Holders[.]”  
(App. at 2231.)  That deadline was later pushed to October 16 
in exchange for, among other things, a $50 million settlement 
deposit to be paid for by Millennium and guaranteed by MLH 
and TA.   
 
On October 15, 2015, Millennium, its equity holders, 
and the ad hoc group – Voya excepted – entered into a 
restructuring support agreement (the “Restructuring 
Agreement” or “Agreement”), which provided for either an 
out-of-court restructuring or a Chapter 11 reorganization of 
Millennium’s business.  Under the Agreement, MLH and TA 
agreed to pay $325 million, which would be used to reimburse 
Millennium for the $50 million settlement deposit, pay the 
remainder of the $256 million settlement, and cover certain of 
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Millennium’s fees, costs, and working capital requirements.  
The Agreement also required Millennium’s equity holders, 
including MLH and TA, to transfer 100% of the equity 
interests in Millennium to the company’s lenders.  Voya would 
receive its share of equity in the deal.  In exchange, MLH, TA, 
and various others were to “receive full releases” for 
themselves and related parties regarding all claims arising from 
conduct that occurred before the Restructuring Agreement, 
including anything related to the 2014 credit agreement, and, 
in the case of a Chapter 11 reorganization, those individuals 
and entities covered by the Restructuring Agreement were to 
“be subject to a bar order, an injunction and related protective 
provisions” to enforce the releases.  (App. at 518.)  As a result 
of the Restructuring Agreement, Millennium was able to enter 
a final settlement with the government on October 16, 2015, 
which required payment of the settlement deposit in October 
and payment of the remainder of the settlement by 
December 30, 2015.     
 
The Restructuring Agreement was reached only after 
intensive negotiations.  Indeed, the negotiations were described 
by participants as “highly adversarial[,]” “extremely 
complicated[,]” and at “arm’s-length,” and in those 
negotiations “the parties all were represented by sophisticated 
and experienced professionals.”  (App. at 2229-30.)  MLH and 
TA rejected the ad hoc group’s suggestion of potential claims 
against them.  “[P]rior to substantive negotiations 
commencing, it did not appear that [MLH and TA] had 
signaled a willingness to pay even any portion of the 
proposed … settlement.”  (App. at 2230.)  Rather, they were 
only “willing to consider a tender of their equity ownership of 
the Company in exchange for broad general releases[.]”  (App. 




From at least mid-August 2015, negotiations took place 
“on an almost daily basis[.]”  (App. at 2231.)  Before 
September 30, however, and despite “extensive negotiations 
between the Equity Holders and the Ad Hoc Group during the 
prior months, the Equity Holders’ last and ‘best’ offer was, in 
addition to turning over the Company’s equity to the Lenders, 
$275 million[,] and the Ad Hoc Group … had demanded a 
$375 million contribution[.]”  (App. at 2232-33.)   
 
The impasse was broken during the negotiation session 
that occurred on September 30.  That session was viewed as 
“do or die” for Millennium and as having “decisive 
implications for the lenders and the equity” because, if the 
October 2 deadline was not met, the government would revoke 
Millennium’s Medicare billing privileges.  (App. at 2231-32.)  
In the last event, MLH and TA increased their offer to $325 
million, and the ad hoc group of lenders agreed to the revised 
terms.  According to an individual involved in the negotiations, 
that deal – later embodied in the Agreement – was “the best 
possible deal achievable” and left nothing else “on the table[.]” 
(App. at 2233.) 
 
The release provisions MLH and TA obtained in 
exchange for their contribution, were, in short, “heavily 
negotiated among the Debtors, the Equity Holders and the Ad 
Hoc Group” and necessary to the entire agreed resolution.  
(App. at 2234.)  They “were specifically demanded by the 
Equity Holders as a condition to making the[ir] contribution” 
and, without them, MLH and TA “would not have agreed” to 
the settlement.  (App. at 2234.)  The contribution was, of 
course, also necessary to induce the lenders’ support of the 
Agreement.  Thus, as stated by both the Bankruptcy Court and 
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District Court after careful fact finding, the deal to avoid 
corporate destruction would not have been possible without the 
third-party releases.   
 
After entering into the Restructuring Agreement, the 
parties thereto initially sought to reorganize Millennium out of 
court, and “over 93% of the Prepetition Lenders by value” 
agreed to do so.  (App. at 1205.)  That, however, was not 
enough.  Voya held out, and Millennium filed its petition for 
bankruptcy in November 2015.  It submitted to the Bankruptcy 
Court a “Prepackaged Joint Plan of Reorganization of 
Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, et al.” that reflected the 
terms of the Restructuring Agreement.2  (App. at 407.)  The 
plan contained broad releases, including ones that would bind 
non-consenting lenders such as Voya, in favor of Millennium, 
MLH, and TA, among others.  Those releases specifically 
covered any claims “arising out of, or in any way related to in 
any manner,” the 2014 credit agreement.  (App. at 416.)  To 
enforce the releases, the plan also provided for a bar order and 
an injunction prohibiting those bound by the releases from 
commencing or prosecuting any actions with respect to the 
claims released under the plan.       
 
Voya objected to confirmation of the plan.3  It explained 
that it intended to assert claims against MLH and TA for what 
it said were material misrepresentations made in connection 
                                              
2 The plan was later amended to eliminate a disputed 
provision that is not at issue in this appeal.   
 
3 The United States Trustee objected as well.  Those 




with the 2014 credit agreement.  In Voya’s view, at the time of 
the credit agreement, Millennium knew of the legal scrutiny it 
was under by the government but made “affirmative 
representations … which specifically indicated that there was 
no investigation pending that could result in a material adverse 
situation[,]” and Millennium further represented that it was not 
doing anything potentially illegal.  (App. at 1309.)  Voya thus 
asserted that it had significant legal claims against Millennium 
and Millennium’s equity holders, that the releases of the equity 
holders were unlawful, and that the Bankruptcy Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to approve them.   
 
The Bankruptcy Court overruled Voya’s objections and 
confirmed the plan on December 14, 2015.4  Voya then 
appealed to the District Court, arguing, among other things, 
that the Bankruptcy Court lacked the constitutional authority 
to order the releases and injunctions.  In response, the 
Appellees, all of whom are named as released parties in the 
confirmed plan, moved to dismiss, pressing especially that the 
case is equitably moot.  The District Court, however, remanded 
the case for the Bankruptcy Court to consider whether it – the 
Bankruptcy Court – had constitutional authority to confirm a 
plan releasing Voya’s claims, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011).    
 
                                              
4 A few days earlier, on December 9, 2015, Voya had 
filed suit against TA, MLH, and various affiliates in the 
District Court asserting RICO, RICO conspiracy, fraud and 
deceit, aiding and abetting fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, 
and restitution claims.  That case has been stayed pending the 
present litigation.  ISL Loan Tr. v. TA Assocs. Mgmt., L.P., No. 
15-cv-1138 (D. Del.) (D.I. 11). 
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On remand, the Bankruptcy Court wrote a detailed and 
closely reasoned opinion explaining its conclusion that it had 
constitutional authority.  It said that Stern is inapplicable when, 
as in this instance, the proceeding at issue is plan confirmation, 
and that, even if Stern did apply, the limitations imposed by 
that precedent would be satisfied.  Voya appealed and the 
Appellees moved again to dismiss the matter as equitably 
moot.   
 
The District Court, in an equally thoughtful opinion, 
affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling on constitutional 
authority, reasoning, in relevant part, that Stern is inapplicable 
to plan confirmation proceedings.  The Court then dismissed 
the remainder of Voya’s challenges as equitably moot because 
the releases and related provisions were central to the 
reorganization plan and excising them would unravel the plan, 
and because it would be inequitable to allow Voya to benefit 
from the restructuring while also pursuing claims that MLH 
and TA had paid to settle.  Finally, in the alternative, the 
District Court reasoned that, even if the Bankruptcy Court 
lacked constitutional authority to confirm the plan, and even if 
the appeal were not equitably moot, the District Court itself 
would affirm the confirmation order by rejecting Voya’s 
challenges on the merits.   
 





 The Parties press a number of arguments, but we need 
only address two: first, whether the Bankruptcy Court had 
constitutional authority to confirm the plan releasing and 
enjoining Voya’s claims against MLH and TA; and second, 
whether this appeal, including Voya’s arguments that the 
release provisions violate the Bankruptcy Code, is otherwise 
equitably moot.  Because the answer to both of those questions 
is yes, we will affirm. 
 
                                              
5 While the Bankruptcy Court’s authority is at issue, it 
had jurisdiction to consider this dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 157, 1334.  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 158(a), 1334, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 1291.  U.S. Tr. v. Gryphon at Stone Mansion, 
Inc., 166 F.3d 552, 553 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Semcrude, L.P., 
728 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2013).  “In reviewing the 
Bankruptcy Court’s determinations, we exercise the same 
standard of review as did the District Court.  We therefore 
review the Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations de novo 
and … its factual determinations for clear error.”  In re 
Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “We review the [District] Court’s 
equitable mootness determination for abuse of discretion.”  In 




A. The Bankruptcy Court Possessed the 
Constitutional Authority to Confirm the Plan 
Containing the Release Provisions 
Voya’s primary argument is that, under the reasoning of 
Stern v. Marshall, the Bankruptcy Court lacked the 
constitutional authority to confirm a plan releasing its 
claims.6  To explain why we disagree, we first consider the 
reach of Stern and then how the decision applies here. 
 
i. The Reasoning and Reach of Stern v. 
Marshall 
 
In Stern, the son of a deceased oil magnate filed an 
adversary complaint in bankruptcy court against his 
stepmother for defamation and also “filed a proof of claim for 
the defamation action, meaning that he sought to recover 
damages for it from [the] bankruptcy estate.”7  564 U.S. at 470.  
                                              
6 The parties also contest whether the constitutionality 
of the Bankruptcy Court’s decision is a threshold issue that 
must be decided before assessing equitable mootness.   Since 
we conclude that the Bankruptcy Court possessed 
constitutional authority, we need not decide whether there is a 
set order of operations. 
 
7  Both the litigation culminating in the Supreme Court’s 
Stern decision, and the Stern decision itself,  received 
significant public attention based on the litigants’ identities.  
The stepmother was the late Vickie Lynn Marshall, widely 
known as Anna Nicole Smith.  The stepson was the late E. 
Pierce Marshall, son of the deceased oil magnate, J. Howard 
Marshall II.    
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The dispute was part of a long running battle over the oil 
magnate’s estate, and the stepmother – who was the debtor in 
bankruptcy – responded to the defamation claim by asserting 
truth as a defense and filing her own counterclaim for tortiously 
interfering with a gift (i.e., a trust of which she would be the 
beneficiary) that she had expected to receive from her late 
husband.  Id.  The bankruptcy court granted summary 
judgment for the stepmother on the defamation claim and then, 
after a bench trial, ruled in her favor on the tortious interference 
counterclaim.  Id.  
 
The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether 
the bankruptcy court had the authority to adjudicate the 
counterclaim.  The Court first decided that the bankruptcy 
court was statutorily authorized to do so.  Id. at 475-78.  It said 
that bankruptcy courts may hear and enter final judgments in 
what the bankruptcy code frames as “core proceedings,” and 
the Court further ruled that the counterclaim was such a 
proceeding because, under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), “core 
proceedings include ‘counterclaims by the [bankruptcy] estate 
against persons filing claims against the estate.’”  Stern, 564 
U.S. at 475. 
 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
bankruptcy court’s actions violated Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Id. at 482.  Quoting Northern Pipeline 
Construction Company v. Marathon Pipe Line Company, 458 
U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment), the 
Court reasoned that, “[w]hen a suit is made of ‘the stuff of the 
traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at 
Westminster in 1789,’ and is brought within the bounds of 
federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit 
rests with Article III judges in Article III courts.”  Stern, 564 
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U.S. at 484.  The bankruptcy court had gone beyond 
constitutional limits when it “exercised the ‘judicial Power of 
the United States’ in purporting to resolve and enter final 
judgment on a state common law claim[.]”  Id. at 487. 
 
The Supreme Court went on to explain that the 
counterclaim also not did fall within the “public rights” 
exception to the exercise of judicial power contemplated by 
Article III.  Under the public rights exception, Congress may 
constitutionally allocate to “legislative” – i.e., non-Article III – 
courts the authority to resolve disputes that arise “in connection 
with the performance of the constitutional functions of the 
executive or legislative departments[.]”  Id. at 489 (citation 
omitted).  Although acknowledging that the exception is not 
well defined, the Court explained that it is generally limited to 
“cases in which the claim at issue derives from a federal 
regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim by an 
expert Government agency is deemed essential to a limited 
regulatory objective within the agency’s authority.” Id. at 490.  
The Court had little difficulty concluding that the stepmother’s 
counterclaim, which arose “under state common law between 
two private parties,” and, at best, had a highly tenuous 
connection to federal law, did not “fall within any of the varied 
formulations of the public rights exception[.]”  Id. at 493.  But 
the Court made clear that it had never decided and was not then 
deciding whether “the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations 
is in fact a public right.”  Id. at 492 n.7 (citation omitted). 
 
The Supreme Court also rejected the stepmother’s 
argument that her counterclaim could be decided in bankruptcy 
court because the stepson had filed a proof of claim.  Id. at 495.  
In doing so, though, the Court interpreted two of its previous 
opinions as concluding that matters arising in the claims-
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approval process could be adjudicated by a bankruptcy court.  
Id. at 495-97.  The Court said that Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 
323 (1966), stood for the proposition that a “voidable 
preference claim” could be decided by a bankruptcy 
adjudicator “because it was not possible for the [adjudicator] 
to rule on the creditor’s proof of claim without first resolving 
the voidable preference issue.”  Stern, 564 U.S. at 496.  It 
further observed that its decision in Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 
U.S. 42 (1990) (per curiam), was “to the same effect” and had 
concluded “that a preferential transfer claim can be heard in 
bankruptcy when the allegedly favored creditor has filed a 
claim, because then [i.e., after the creditor’s claim has been 
filed,] ‘the ensuing preference action by the trustee become[s] 
integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor 
relationship.’” Stern, 564 U.S. at 497 (second alteration in 
original) (citation omitted).  The Court distinguished that 
situation from the dispute before it in Stern because there was 
little overlap between the debtor-stepmother’s tortious 
interference counterclaim and the creditor-stepson’s 
defamation claim and “there was never any reason to believe 
that the process of adjudicating [the] proof of claim would 
necessarily resolve [the] counterclaim.”  Id.  Finally, it 
explained that, “[i]n both Katchen and Langenkamp, … the 
trustee bringing the preference action was asserting a right of 
recovery created by federal bankruptcy law[,]” but the 
stepmother’s counterclaim was “in no way derived from or 
dependent upon bankruptcy law; it [was] a state tort action that 
exist[ed] without regard to any bankruptcy proceeding.”  Id. at 
498-99.  The Court concluded by saying “that Congress may 
not bypass Article III simply because a proceeding may have 
some bearing on a bankruptcy case[.]” Id. at 499.  In language 
central to the issue before us, the Court said, “the question is 
whether the action at issue stems from the bankruptcy itself or 
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would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance 
process.”  Id.  
 
Stern makes several points that are important here.  
First, bankruptcy courts may violate Article III even while 
acting within their statutory authority in “core” matters.  Cf. 
Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 30-31 
(2014) (describing “Stern claims” as “claim[s] designated for 
final adjudication in the bankruptcy court as a statutory matter, 
but prohibited from proceeding in that way as a constitutional 
matter”).  Thus, even in cases in which a bankruptcy court 
exercises its “core” statutory authority, it may be necessary to 
consider whether that exercise of authority comports with the 
Constitution. 
 
Second, a bankruptcy court is within constitutional 
bounds when it resolves a matter that is integral to the 
restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship.  The Stern 
Court relied on Katchen and Langenkamp as examples of a 
bankruptcy court’s constitutionally appropriate adjudication of 
claims.  Of particular note, and as quoted earlier, the Court in 
discussing Langenkamp said that it held there that a particular 
“claim can be heard in bankruptcy when the … creditor has 
filed a claim, because then ‘the ensuing preference action by 
the trustee become[s] integral to the restructuring of the debtor-
creditor relationship.’”  Stern, 564 U.S. at 497 (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted).  In other words, the Court 
concluded that bankruptcy courts can constitutionally decide 
matters arising in the claims-allowance process, and they can 
do that because matters arising in the claims-allowance process 
are integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor 
18 
 
relationship.8  Id. at 492 n.7, 497 (citations omitted).  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court made it clear that, for there to 
be constitutional authority, a matter need not stem from the 
bankruptcy itself.  That is evident from its declaration of a two-
part disjunctive test.  The Court said that “the question 
[governing the extent to which a bankruptcy court may 
                                              
8 Again, and as noted on page 15 supra, we recognize 
that the Supreme Court declined to determine whether, as a 
general matter, “restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is in 
fact a public right.”  Stern, 564 U.S. at 492 n.7 (citation 
omitted).  Thus, the Court’s conclusion that bankruptcy courts 
can decide matters integral to the restructuring of debtor-
creditor relations may not have been grounded in public rights 
doctrine.  Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts, the author of Stern, 
has suggested as much.  Cf. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. 
Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1951 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Our precedents have also recognized an exception to the 
requirements of Article III for certain bankruptcy proceedings.  
When the Framers gathered to draft the Constitution, English 
statutes had long empowered nonjudicial bankruptcy 
‘commissioners’ to collect a debtor’s property, resolve claims 
by creditors, order the distribution of assets in the estate, and 
ultimately discharge the debts.  This historical practice, 
combined with Congress’s constitutional authority to enact 
bankruptcy laws, confirms that Congress may assign to non-
Article III courts adjudications involving ‘the restructuring of 
debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal 
bankruptcy power.’” (internal citations omitted)).  We need not 
identify the theory behind the Supreme Court’s conclusion, 
however, because, regardless, “we are bound to follow [the 
Court’s] teachings [.]”  St. Margaret Mem’l Hosp. v. NLRB, 
991 F.2d 1146, 1154 (3d Cir. 1993).  
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constitutionally exercise power] is whether the action at issue 
stems from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be 
resolved in the claims allowance process.”  Id. at 499 
(emphasis added). 
 
The third take-away from Stern is that, when 
determining whether a bankruptcy court has acted within its 
constitutional authority, courts should generally focus not on 
the category of the “core” proceeding but rather on the content 
of the proceeding.  The Stern Court never said that all 
counterclaims by a debtor are beyond the reach of bankruptcy 
courts.  Rather, it explained that those that do not “stem[] from 
the bankruptcy itself or would [not] necessarily be resolved in 
the claims allowance process” (and therefore would not be 
integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship) 
must be decided by Article III courts.  Id. at 497, 499.  And, 
the Court looked to the content of the debtor’s counterclaim in 
applying that test.  It compared the factual and legal 
determinations necessary to resolve the tortious interference 
counterclaim to those necessary to resolve the defamation 
claim to assess whether the counterclaim would necessarily be 
resolved in the claims-allowance process, and it looked to the 
basis for the counterclaim to determine whether it stemmed 
from the bankruptcy itself.9  Id. at 498-99. 
 
                                              
9 To be sure, the Supreme Court made clear that the 
claims-allowance process – a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(b)(2)(B) – is per se integral to the restructuring of the 
debtor-creditor relationship and, therefore, that the category of 
proceeding is controlling in that context.  Stern, 564 U.S. at 
497-99.  But we have no guidance as to whether any other 
categories of core proceedings might be treated similarly. 
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In sum, Stern teaches that the exercise of “core” 
statutory authority by a bankruptcy court can implicate the 
limits imposed by Article III.  Such an exercise of authority is 
permissible if it involves a matter integral to the restructuring 
of the debtor-creditor relationship.  And, in determining 
whether that is the case, we can consider the content of the 
“core” proceeding at issue. 
 
ii. The Bankruptcy Court Had 
Constitutional Authority Under Stern  
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at hand 
leads to the conclusion that the Bankruptcy Court possessed 
constitutional authority to confirm the plan containing the 
release provisions.  The Bankruptcy Court indisputably had 
“core” statutory authority to confirm the plan.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(b)(2)(L) (“Core proceedings include, but are not limited 
to …[,] confirmations of plans[.]”).  The question is whether, 
looking to the content of the plan, the Bankruptcy Court was 
resolving a matter integral to the restructuring of the debtor-
creditor relationship.10  The only terms at issue are the 
provisions releasing and enjoining Voya’s claims. 
 
Those provisions were thoroughly and thoughtfully 
addressed by the Bankruptcy Court.  It held that “[t]he 
injunctions and releases provisions are critical to the success of 
the Plan” because, “[w]ithout the releases, and the enforcement 
of such releases through the Plan’s injunction provisions, the 
                                              
10 The Appellees argue that a bankruptcy court can 
always constitutionally confirm a plan.  We have our doubts 
about so broad a statement but we do not need to address it to 
decide this case. 
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Released Parties [would not be] willing to make their 
contributions under the Plan” and, “[a]bsent those 
contributions, the Debtors [would] be unable to satisfy their 
obligations under the USA Settlement Agreements [i.e., the 
settlement with the government] and no chapter 11 plan 
[would] be feasible and the Debtors would likely [have] shut 
down upon the revocation of their Medicare enrollment and 
billing privileges.”  (App. at 24; see also App. at 3596, 3598 
(the Bankruptcy Court stating that “it is clear that the releases 
are necessary to both obtaining the funding and consummating 
a plan” and that “[w]ithout [MLH and TA’s] contributions, 
there is no reorganization”).)  Those conclusions are well 
supported by the record.  (App. at 1575-80, 2230, 2233-35; D. 
Ct. D.I. 25-2, at *233-34.)  Indeed, the record makes 
abundantly clear that the release provisions – agreed to only 
after extensive, arm’s length negotiations – were absolutely 
required to induce MLH and TA to pay the funds needed to 
effectuate Millennium’s settlement with the government and 
prevent the government from revoking Millennium’s Medicare 
billing privileges.  Absent MLH and TA’s payment, the 
company could not have paid the government, with the result 
that liquidation, not reorganization, would have been 
Millennium’s sole option.  Restructuring in this case was 
possible only because of the release provisions.   
 
To Voya, that point is irrelevant.11  Voya contends that 
Stern demands an Article III adjudicator decide its RICO/fraud 
claims because those claims do not stem from the bankruptcy 
itself and would not be resolved in the claims-allowance 
process.  It asserts that the limiting phrase from Stern, i.e., 
                                              
11 In fact, Voya does not even argue in its briefing that 
the release provisions were not integral to the restructuring.  
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“necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process[,]” 
cannot be stretched to cover all matters integral to the 
restructuring.  (Opening Br. at 31.)  In that regard, Voya argues 
that an assertion that something is “integral to the 
restructuring” is really “nothing more than a description of the 
claims allowance process.”  (Reply Br. at 13.)   
 
That argument fails primarily because it is not faithful 
to what Stern actually says.  Had the Stern Court meant its 
“integral to the restructuring” language to be limited to the 
claims-allowance process, it would not have said that a 
bankruptcy court may decide a matter when a “creditor has 
filed a claim, because then” – adding its own emphasis to that 
word – “the ensuing preference action by the trustee become[s] 
integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor 
relationship.”  564 U.S. at 497 (alteration in original).  That 
phrasing makes clear that the reason bankruptcy courts may 
adjudicate matters arising in the claims-allowance process is 
because those matters are integral to the restructuring of 
debtor-creditor relations, not the other way around.  And, as 
the Appellees correctly observe, Stern is not the first time that 
the Supreme Court has so indicated.  In Granfinanciera, S.A. 
v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) – a case that the Stern Court 
viewed as informing its Article III jurisprudence, 564 U.S. at 
499 – the Court answered first whether an action arose in the 
claims-allowance process and only then whether it was 
otherwise integral to the restructuring of debtor-creditor 
relations.  See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 58 (“Because 
petitioners here … have not filed claims against the estate, 
respondent’s fraudulent conveyance action does not arise ‘as 
part of the process of allowance and disallowance of claims.’  
Nor is that action integral to the restructuring of debtor-creditor 
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relations.”).12  If the first step in that analysis were all that was 
relevant, the second step would not have been taken. 
                                              
12 Voya makes two additional arguments regarding the 
proper interpretation of Stern: that courts of appeals have 
interpreted Stern as centered on the claims-allowance process, 
and that the phrase “integral to the restructuring” is not 
supported by the Supreme Court’s public rights jurisprudence.  
As to the former, we are not convinced that the out-of-circuit 
cases Voya cites are inconsistent with our reading of Stern.  
Stern on its face governed in those cases, so, unlike here, the 
courts had no need to extract a principle beyond Stern’s plain 
terms.  See In re Renewable Energy Dev. Corp., 792 F.3d 1274, 
1279 (10th Cir. 2015) (concluding that Stern provided “all the 
guidance we need to answer this appeal” because the case 
involved the assertion that state law legal malpractice claims 
against the bankruptcy trustee by clients of the trustee in his 
capacity as an attorney should be heard in bankruptcy court 
simply because the malpractice claims were “factually 
‘intertwined’ with the bankruptcy proceedings”); In re Fisher 
Island Invs., Inc., 778 F.3d 1172, 1192 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that Stern did not apply to bar bankruptcy court 
adjudication of a claim where, among other things, that claim 
“was ‘necessarily resolve[d]’ by the bankruptcy court through 
the process of adjudicating the creditors’ claims” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)); In re Glob. Technovations Inc., 
694 F.3d 705, 722 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a bankruptcy 
court’s resolution of one issue was permissible under Stern 
because it was not possible to rule on a proof of claim without 
deciding the issue, and concluding that the bankruptcy court 
could decide a second issue that could have been necessary to 
ruling on a proof of claim but turned out not to be because the 




 Voya also raises a “floodgate” argument, saying that, if 
we allow bankruptcy courts to approve releases merely 
because they appear in a plan, bankruptcy courts’ powers 
would be essentially limitless and that an “integral to the 
restructuring” rule would mean that bankruptcy courts could 
approve releases simply because reorganization financers 
                                              
in advance, which facts will ultimately prove strictly 
necessary”); In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d 553, 
564-65 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a bankruptcy court could 
not resolve a fraudulent conveyance action similar to that in 
Granfinanciera – which the Stern Court made clear could not 
have been adjudicated by a bankruptcy court – because it 
“need not necessarily have been resolved in the course of 
allowing or disallowing the claims against the…estate”); In re 
Ortiz, 665 F.3d 906, 909, 912, 914 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding 
that claims could not be decided by a bankruptcy court because 
the case essentially matched Stern); see also In re Ortiz, 665 
F.3d at 914 (“Non-Article III judges may hear cases when the 
claim arises ‘as part of the process of allowance and 
disallowance of claims,’ or when the claim becomes ‘integral 
to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship[.]’” 
(citations omitted)).  Voya also cites our decision in Billing v. 
Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P.A., 22 F.3d 1242 (3d Cir. 1994), 
but that decision predates Stern and offers no insight into how 
best to interpret it. 
Voya’s second argument, that the rule we adopt today 
would not comport with the Supreme Court’s public rights 
doctrine, similarly is unavailing.  As already noted (see supra 
n. 8), the precise basis for the Court’s “integral to the 
restructuring” conclusion is unstated, and does not necessarily 
flow from the Court’s public rights jurisprudence. 
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demand them, which could lead to gamesmanship.  The 
argument is not without force.  Setting too low a bar for the 
exercise of bankruptcy court authority could seriously 
undermine Article III, which is fundamental to our 
constitutional design.13  It is definitely not our intention to 
permit any action by a bankruptcy court that could 
“compromise” or “chip away at the authority of the Judicial 
Branch[,]” Stern, 564 U.S. at 503, and our decision today 
should not be read as expanding bankruptcy court authority.   
 
 Nor should our decision today be read as permitting or 
encouraging the hypothetical gamesmanship that Voya fears 
will now ensue.  Consistent with prior decisions, we are not 
broadly sanctioning the permissibility of nonconsensual third-
party releases in bankruptcy reorganization plans.  Our 
precedents regarding nonconsensual third-party releases and 
injunctions in the bankruptcy plan context set forth exacting 
standards that must be satisfied if such releases and injunctions 
are to be permitted, and suggest that courts considering such 
releases do so with caution. See In re Global Indus. Techs., 
Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (explaining 
that suit injunctions must be “both necessary to the 
                                              
13 Before the founding, “[t]he colonists had been 
subjected to judicial abuses at the hand of the Crown, and the 
Framers knew the main reasons why: because the King of 
Great Britain ‘made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for 
the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their 
salaries.’”  Stern, 564 U.S. at 483-84 (quoting The Declaration 
of Independence ¶ 11).  Since ratification, Article III has served 
a crucial role in our “system of checks and balances” and 




reorganization and fair”); In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 203 
F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The hallmarks of permissible 
non-consensual releases [are] fairness, necessity to the 
reorganization, and specific factual findings to support these 
conclusions[.]”).  Although we are satisfied that both the 
Bankruptcy Court and District Court exercised appropriate – 
indeed, exemplary – caution and diligence in this instance, 
nothing in our opinion should be construed as reducing a 
court’s obligation to approach the inclusion of nonconsensual 
third-party releases or injunctions in a plan of reorganization 
with the utmost care and to thoroughly explain the justification 
for any such inclusion.   
 
 In short, our holding today is specific and limited.  It is 
that, under the particular facts of this case, the Bankruptcy 
Court’s conclusion that the release provisions were integral to 
the restructuring was well-reasoned and well-supported by the 
record.14  Consequently, the bankruptcy court was 
constitutionally authorized to confirm the plan in which those 
provisions appeared.15 
                                              
14 At oral argument, counsel for Voya candidly 
acknowledged that this is “not the usual case.”  
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/18-
3210InreMilleniumLabHoldings.mp3 (Oral Arg. at 15:03-07.) 
15 The parties disagree as to whether the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision to confirm the plan even implicates Stern and 
Article III.  Voya argues that Stern deprived the Bankruptcy 
Court of jurisdiction because the release provisions in the 
confirmed plan of reorganization constituted a “final 
judgment” on the merits of Voya’s state law claims against 
Millennium.  The Appellees respond that Stern is inapplicable 
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B. The Remainder of the Appeal Is Equitably 
Moot 
 Voya next argues that the District Court erred in 
concluding that the remaining issues on appeal are equitably 
moot.  Again, we disagree. 
 
 “‘Equitable mootness’ is a narrow doctrine by which an 
appellate court deems it prudent for practical reasons to forbear 
deciding an appeal when to grant the relief requested will 
undermine the finality and reliability of consummated plans of 
reorganization.”  In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 277 
(3d Cir. 2015).  At bottom, “[e]quitable mootness assures [the 
estate, the reorganized entity, investors, lenders, customers, 
and other constituents] that a plan confirmation order is reliable 
and that they may make financial decisions based on a 
reorganized entity’s exit from Chapter 11 without fear that an 
appellate court will wipe out or interfere with their deal.”16  Id. 
at 280.   
                                              
here, or at least readily distinguishable, because there is a 
distinction between a court approving the settlement of claims 
and adjudicating claims on the merits.  According to the 
Appellees, the Bankruptcy Court only did the former when it 
approved the plan of reorganization.  Our conclusion that the 
Bankruptcy Court’s actions were constitutionally permissible 
assumes Stern’s application.  Accordingly, it ultimately is 
irrelevant to our decision whether or not the Bankruptcy Court 
issued a “final judgment” on Voya’s underlying claims against 
Millennium, and we do not address that dispute. 
 
16 One of the benefits of bankruptcy is its ability “to aid 




 An equitable mootness analysis proceeds by asking two 
questions: “(1) whether a confirmed plan has been 
substantially consummated; and (2) if so, whether granting the 
relief requested in the appeal will (a) fatally scramble the plan 
and/or (b) significantly harm third parties who have justifiably 
relied on plan confirmation.”  Id. at 278.  Voya concedes that 
the plan here is substantially consummated, so we focus on the 
second question.  Answering it shows that the appeal is indeed 
equitably moot. 
 
 Granting Voya the relief it seeks would certainly 
scramble the plan.  As the District Court explained, “[t]he 
Bankruptcy Court found [Voya’s] releases were central to the 
Plan and, far from being clearly erroneous, [that conclusion] is 
                                              
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918); see In re Trump 
Entm’t Resorts, 810 F.3d 161, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2016) (“A 
Chapter 11 reorganization provides a debtor with an 
opportunity to reduce or extend its debts so its business can 
achieve longterm viability, for instance, by generating profits 
which will compensate creditors for some or all of any losses 
resulting from the bankruptcy.”).  Equitable mootness allows 
that benefit to be realized by, among other things, encouraging 
an end to costly and protracted litigation based on arguable 
blemishes in a reorganization plan.  Cf. In re Tribune, 799 F.3d 
at 288-89 (Ambro, J., concurring) (“Without equitable 
mootness, any dissenting creditor with a plausible (or even not-
so-plausible) sounding argument against plan confirmation 
could effectively hold up emergence from bankruptcy for years 
(or until such time as other constituents decide to pay the 
dissenter sufficient settlement consideration to drop the 
appeal), a most costly proposition.”). 
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strongly supported by uncontroverted evidence in the record.”  
(App. at 374.)  The Bankruptcy Court observed, based on 
unrefuted evidence, that the “third-party releases, all of 
them, … [were] required to obtain the funding for this plan” 
(App. at 3594 (emphasis added)); that “the releases [were] 
necessary to … consummating a plan” (App. at 3596); and that 
“[w]ithout [TA and MLH’s] contributions, there is no 
reorganization.”  (App. at 3598.)  The release provisions, 
carefully crafted through extensive negotiations, served as the 
cornerstone of the reorganization and, hence, of Millennium’s 
corporate survival.  Notably, the confirmed plan contains a 
severability provision stating, “no alteration or interpretation 
[of the plan] can … compel the funding of Settlement 
Contribution if the conditions to such funding set forth in the 
[Restructuring Agreement] have not been satisfied” (App. at 
142),  and the Restructuring Agreement, in turn, says that the 
settlement contribution is contingent on “a full and complete 
release of … the Released Parties” and an injunction to enforce 
the release.  (App. at 196 (emphasis added).)  As the 
Bankruptcy Court recognized, all of the releases were essential 
to the plan. 
 
  But even if some subset of the release provisions could 
be deemed non-essential, it would not be Voya’s.  Voya loaned 
more than $100 million to Millennium through the 2014 credit 
agreement.  Its lawsuit raises several claims based on that loan, 
including RICO, fraud, and restitution claims.17  The restitution 
                                              
17 MLH and TA are named as defendants only as to the 
restitution count.  But defendants on all counts are alleged to 
be close affiliates of MLH and TA.  Importantly, defendant TA 
Associates Management is alleged to control TA, and MLH is 
alleged to be the effective alter ego of defendant James 
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claim alone seeks “restitution of [Voya’s] funds,” among other 
relief (App. at 2355), and presumably the other claims seek 
damages based on the loan amount, trebled for the RICO 
claims.  Opening MLH, TA, and their related parties to well 
over $100 million in liability, above the $325 million that was 
negotiated and paid to settle those same claims, would 
completely undermine the purpose of the release provisions.  
And again, based on the intense, arm’s length negotiations, 
those provisions were included because they were essential to 
obtaining the payment that allowed Millennium’s survival.  
Given the centrality of the release provisions to the 
reorganization, excising them would undermine the 
fundamental basis for the parties’ agreement.   
 
Furthermore, any do-over of the plan at this time would 
likely be impossible and, even if it could be done, would be 
massively disruptive.  Since the plan was confirmed, 
Millennium has paid the government, has “completed 
numerous complex restructuring and related transactions,” and 
has distributed common stock to the lenders under the 2014 
credit agreement.  (App. at 6195, 6199.)  In addition, 
“unsecured creditors [have been] paid the full amount of their 
allowed claims” (Supp. App. at 3); Millennium’s lender and 
equity base has changed dramatically; the company has sold 
off RxAnte; and it “has entered into more than two million 
commercial transactions, many of which are with new counter-
parties.”  (Supp. App. at 5.)  It is inconceivable that these many 
post-confirmation developments could be unwound, 
particularly those involving the government. 
 
                                              
Slattery.  All counts in the complaint are directed against TA 
Associates Management, Slattery, or both.   
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In that same vein, the relief that Voya seeks would 
seriously harm a wide range of third parties.  If the plan could 
somehow be unwound and Millennium put back in its pre-
confirmation position, the interests and expectations of 
Millennium’s new lenders and equity holders – who certainly 
invested in reliance on the reorganization – would be wholly 
undermined.  RxAnte’s acquiror would in turn have to unwind 
that acquisition; contracts and transactions with counterparties 
would be scuttled; and the status of Millennium and all of its 
employees and contractors would obviously be placed in 
severe jeopardy. 
 
Our decision in In re Tribune is on point.  There, a 
confirmed plan contained provisions settling certain claims by 
the estate against various parties connected with a leveraged 
buyout of the debtor.  In re Tribune, 799 F.3d at 275-76.  The 
appellant, a creditor, conceded that the plan was substantially 
consummated but argued that the relief it sought – 
reinstatement of settled causes of action – would not fatally 
harm the plan or third parties.  Id. at 277, 280.  We thought 
otherwise and said that allowing the suits barred by the 
settlement “would knock the props out from under the 
authorization for every transaction that has taken place, thus 
scrambling this substantially consummated plan and upsetting 
third parties’ reliance on it.”  Id. at 281 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We observed that the settlement 
was “a central issue in the formulation of a plan of 
reorganization” and that “allowing the relief the appeal seeks 
would effectively undermine the Settlement (along with the 
transactions entered in reliance on it) and, as a result, recall the 
entire Plan for a redo.”  Id. at 280-81.  It was plain that third 
parties would be harmed because, among other things, 
“returning to the drawing board would at a minimum 
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drastically diminish the value of new equity’s investment[,]” 
which “no doubt was [made] in reliance on the Settlement[.]”  
Id. at 281.  That same reasoning applies with great force in this 
case.18 
 
                                              
18 Voya tries to distinguish In re Tribune by arguing that 
the appellant there sought to scuttle the settlement provisions 
in their entirety, unlike here.  But eliminating the release 
provisions as to Voya would have the same effect as 
eliminating the release provisions in their entirety: the plan 
would fall apart.   
Voya also points us to several other decisions it views 
as demonstrating that we have “found bankruptcy appeals not 
to be equitably moot where, as here, a party merely seeks 
revival of discrete released claims that would not otherwise 
upset a confirmed plan.”  (Opening Br. at 51.)  The cases it 
highlights, however, unlike the matter now before us, all 
involved release provisions that were not central to the plans at 
issue.  See In re Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 324 (holding that a case 
was not equitably moot because, among other things, granting 
the requested relief “would [not] upset the [settlement] 
or … cause the remainder of the plan to collapse” and the 
amounts involved in the suit would not “destabilize the 
financial basis of the settlement”); In re PWS Holding Corp., 
228 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting an equitable 
mootness argument where “[t]he releases (or some of the 
releases) could be stricken from the plan without undoing other 
portions of it”); In re Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d at 210 
(rejecting an equitable mootness challenge because, among 
other things, “[n]o evidence or arguments [were] presented that 
Plaintiffs’ appeal, if successful, would necessitate the reversal 
or unraveling of the entire plan of reorganization”). 
33 
 
Voya raises several unpersuasive arguments 
challenging the District Court’s equitable mootness decision.  
In spite of all the evidence, it contends that striking the release 
provisions only as to it would not cause the plan to collapse.  It 
says that the remainder of the plan would stay in place, 
including the release provisions as to other parties, given that 
the other lenders consented.  According to Voya, nothing in the 
plan would authorize MLH and TA to demand the return of 
their contribution if the release provisions were stricken, and it 
claims that, in fact, the plan anticipates “just such a scenario 
and gives [MLH and TA] … the ability to access insurance 
coverage and/or indemnification from Debtors (capped at $3 
million) for defense costs.”  (Opening Br. at 50.)  But, as 
explained above, striking the release provisions as to Voya 
would certainly undermine the plan.  That the plan provides for 
“insurance coverage and/or indemnification” as a contingency 
does not change that.  As previously noted, the plan says that 
the settlement payment, the very payment on which 
Millennium’s viability as a going concern depended, could not 
be compelled absent full and complete releases from all of 
Millennium’s pre-bankruptcy lenders, including Voya.   
 
 Voya next argues that granting it relief will not disturb 
legitimate third-party expectations.  As to that point, it declares 
that MLH and TA’s reliance interests do not count, “both 
because they are relying on the Plan to obtain unlawful 
nonconsensual releases to which they are not legally entitled 
and because they are sophisticated parties who were intimately 
involved in constructing the Plan and fully aware of the 
appellate risks when they allowed it to be consummated.”  
(Opening Br. at 53.)  But, besides the circularity of its 
reasoning, Voya’s position misses the mark, as it ignores the 
fact that numerous other third parties, including Millennium’s 
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new post-bankruptcy equity holders and lenders, would be 
harmed significantly by any effort to unwind the plan. 
 
 Voya also raises a series of arguments claiming that it 
would be fair to strike the releases as to it while not returning 
any of MLH and TA’s contribution and without requiring Voya 
to return any of the value it obtained by way of the 
reorganization.19  Each of those arguments is a non-starter.  
Voya wants all of the value of the restructuring and none of the 
pain.  That is a fantasy and upends the purpose of the equitable 
mootness doctrine, which is designed to prevent inequitable 
outcomes.  Cf. In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 235-
36 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Under the doctrine of equitable mootness, 
an appeal should be dismissed … if the implementation of that 
relief would be inequitable.” (emphasis added)).   “Equity 
abhors a windfall.” US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 
671, 679 (3d Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 569 U.S. 
                                              
19 Voya says that that course of action would not be 
inequitable because it did not receive any consideration for 
releasing its claims; that the plan gave MLH and TA the right 
to insist that plan consummation be delayed until all appeals 
were exhausted, and they instead assumed the risk of an 
adverse ruling; that, “prior to the bankruptcy, [MLH and 
TA] were willing to make the same $325 million contribution 
in the context of an out-of-court restructuring, even if they did 
not receive releases from non-consenting Lenders holding up 
to $50 million (subject to increase) of aggregate principal term 
loan balance” (Reply Br. at 9); that MLH and TA attempted to 
leverage Millennium’s distress to obtain the release provisions; 
and that MLH and TA were aware at the time they obtained the 
release provisions that our precedents regarding such 
provisions were unclear. 
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88, 106 (2013); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. S.S. Am. Lancer, 
870 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1989).  Voya would receive a 
windfall – at the substantial and uncompensated expense of 
MLH and TA – if we were to let it avoid the release provisions 
without requiring it to return the value it obtained through the 
reorganization consummated on the basis of those release 
provisions and without allowing MLH and TA to recover their 
contribution.  Voya’s arguments also fail by their own terms.  
The question of whether Voya received consideration for the 
releases is a merits question, not an equitable mootness one. 
See In re United Artists Theatre Co., 315 F.3d 217, 227 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (explaining that non-consensual releases must be 
given in exchange for fair consideration, among other things).  
And, regardless of formal consideration, it would still be 
inequitable to let Voya retain the benefits of the settlement and 
still have the right to sue.  See In re Tribune, 799 F.3d at 281 
(“When determining whether the case is equitably moot, we of 
course must assume [the appellant] will prevail on the merits 
because the idea of equitable mootness is that even if [the 
appellant] is correct, it would not be fair to award the relief it 
seeks.”).   
 
 In the end, the operative question for our equitable 
mootness inquiry is straightforward: would granting Voya 
relief fatally scramble the plan and/or harm third parties.  The 
answer is clearly yes.20  Granting Voya’s requested relief 
would lead to profoundly inequitable results, and the District 
                                              
20 Nothing in our opinion should be read to imply that 
review of reorganization plans involving third-party releases 
will always or even often be barred as equitably moot and 
therefore effectively unreviewable.  Again, our holding today 
is specific and limited to the particular facts of this case. 
36 
 
Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the appeal 
was equitably moot. 
 
III. CONCLUSION  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision 
of the District Court. 
